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OPENING
REMARKS OF CHAIRMAN DUNCAN HUNTER
Hearing on Operation Iraqi Freedom: Outside
Perspectives
Even as major combat operations drew to a
close last May, the battle over the lessons
learned from Operation Iraqi Freedom was
beginning. A few weeks ago, this committee
heard from the commanding general of Joint
Forces Command, Admiral Giambastiani, whose
embedded combat observers and analysts are
refining the joint operational lessons learned
from OIF. The Joint Staff continues its work
to distill the strategic lessons learned,
while the services are cataloguing their
tactical lessons from this conflict.
Today, we will hear outside
perspectives on Operation Iraqi Freedom and
implications for future warfare and U.S.
national security policy. As with any war
waged by the United States, it is critical
that we engage in an open and vigorous
critique of our actions so that future
military leaders can draw the correct lessons
and apply them to the next conflict. One need
only look at the erroneous lessons learned by
the French military following World War I to
see the value of a rigorous lessons-learned
effort.
The aftermath of OIF raises
some serious questions on the future of
warfare. Chief among these is whether the
major combat phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom
is the last war of some former era in warfare,
or the first war of a new era. Some observers
believe that speed, precision and superior
knowledge were the reasons for success in Iraq
and herald a new type of warfare. If we invest
in more high-tech systems that provide perfect
knowledge of the battlefield, and combine them
with increasingly capable precision weapons,
we can ensure victory in any future conflict.
To this, I would remind my friends that chess
players always have perfect knowledge of the
board, and their pieces always strike with
perfect precision - but this does not always
ensure a successful game.
Others have suggested just the
opposite - that the major conflict phase of
OIF holds few lessons for future conflicts.
They argue that future wars will look more
like the current phase of Iraqi Freedom, with
its various religious and ethnic factions and
rivalries, foreign terrorists, shadowy
non-state actors, guerilla bombings, and
hidden weapons of mass destruction. Emerging
non-traditional threats, not conventional land
forces, will be the real threat. In this
environment, more human intelligence, rapidly
deployable and flexible forces and superior
training hold the key to victory.
The issues we will discuss
here today are much more than a sterile
academic class on the nature of future
conflict. The lessons we draw from this and
other recent military operations will inform
this committee's decisions regarding how our
forces will be sized and shaped in the years
to come. They will also inform us as to the
nature, quantity and type of hardware and
munitions we need to buy for our men and women
in uniform so that they can meet the
challenges of the future battlefield.
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