Good afternoon Mr. Chairman, I am Mark Camillo, currently serving as a Director in the Washington Operations Offices of Lockheed Martin Corporation, working in the area of Homeland Security, here in the National Capitol Region. Although my exposure to advanced technologies, systems and services since joining Lockheed Martin have added to the depth of my knowledge relative to public safety and security, one of my previous assignments while serving in the U.S. Secret Service will hopefully be of particular value to this hearing.

From 1999 through 2002, I served as the Secret Service Winter Olympic Coordinator for the 2002 Salt Lake Winter Olympics. This assignment entailed the designing, planning and implementing of the Federal operational security plan for the Games.

Protecting Olympic games was not viewed as a new idea as the security plan was being contemplated for Salt Lake. Protocols and traditions passed on from previous Olympic security planners lent credence to studying after action reports from previous games and visiting/interacting with Olympic security officials who were either preparing or actually executing their plan. Hence, traveling to observe an actual Olympic event was extremely beneficial.

Leadership Roles

You might wonder what actual role the agency responsible for protecting the President and other key Government Officials had for the Salt Lake Games. The Secret Service had a significant role in the security operations of the Games, due a Presidential Decision Directive executed in 1998, which put the Secret Service in the lead Federal role for operational security at National Special Security Events (NSSE). When any event is designated a NSSE, the Service is joined by the FBI, who has the crisis response lead, and FEMA, who has the consequence lead.

LESSON LEARNED: HAVE A TEAM SELECTED WITH COMPLEMENTARY SKILLS AND THE INSTITUTIONAL EXPERIENCE TO TACKLE AN EVENT OF THIS PORPORTION. Partnerships

Although the Federal team mentioned in the NSSE “package” sounds complete, they become integrated components, after joining the state and local public safety planners, who have an equally vested interest in a safe and successful event.

We learned in Utah that partnerships were also critical with the Salt Lake Organizing Committee (SLOC), who had the ultimate responsibility for the Games, and other key planners such as the Military and others in the public and private sector. The glue that held all these partnerships together consisted mainly of trust and mutual respect.

Although Federal and State efforts to create sanctioned gatherings were largely successful, SLOC never lost sight of the value of communication and went to great efforts to ensure that all those who represented the key entities had ample opportunities to communicate, whether it was at a weekly scheduled meeting or a daily conference phone call. What we found was that rumors or concerns could be quickly put to rest, allowing more time to move collectively forward.

Many committees were formulated. Some were in a steering capacity, and some were in a working capacity. The most prominent one was the Utah Olympic Public Safety Command. A State legislated entity that had representation from all the counties affected by the Games. Additionally, key Federal partners were participants, as well as a representative from SLOC. Again, another example of promoting partnerships with all key public safety stakeholders.

LESSON LEARNED: FORMING PARTNERSHIPS AT ALL LEVELS AND PROVIDING THE OPPORTUNITY TO COMMUNICATE REDUCED SUSPICION AND DISTRUST.

Operational Security

What might be viewed as a new approach to securing the 2002 Winter Olympics was the inclusion of a very pronounced prevention and preparedness theme to the security operations in and around the official venues. Core components including physical infrastructure, HAZMAT/Explosive Ordinance Detection and access control were weaved into the general design plan of the venues. SLOC understood and worked in unison with the security planners to place security elements where they provided most value. The security planners in turn, studied existing site plans developed by SLOC in the early stages to find ways to introduce security elements into the venues in the least obtrusive way. With all security components operational before the gates opened, the venues were transformed into “operationally clean security environments” that provided in essence a filter for preventing acts of terrorism or criminality within the site.

LESSON LEARNED: HAVING A ROBUST PREVENTION AND PREPAREDNESS CAPABILITY AT THE OFFICIAL VENUES DRAMATICALLY REDUCED THE CHANCES OF TERRORISM OR CRIMINALITY DISRUPTING THE EVENT.

Human Resources

With a very limited number of state law enforcement personnel available, and a projected requirement of approximately twice the size of the state law enforcement workforce for overall public safety, a decision was made to turn to federal agencies for assistance. We were faced with challenges such as different job classifications (Officer vs. Agent) and commissioned authority. Also, equally challenging was drawing from all over the United States, which potentially meant assigning a Deputy U.S. Marshal from Miami to a security post on the side of a mountain, or placing a U.S. Park Ranger from Wyoming at a checkpoint in an ice skating venue. The solution to this problem was identifying representatives from each agency who worked in advance with the Olympic planners to match skills and interests with Olympic security assignments. Consequently, Federal officers who had skills and abilities conducive to the alpine venues were assigned accordingly. Distance learning CDs were developed and forwarded to pre-selected officers to prepare them for their assignments. Cold weather gear was also procured and issued once Officers arrived for duty. This also added to boosting morale since most assignments lasted on average of three weeks.

LESSON LEARNED: ONCE SECURITY POSTS ARE IDENTIFIED, MATCHING OFFICERS WHO HAVE THE REQUISITE SKILLS, EXPERIENCES AND PROVIDING EQUIPMENT GREATLY INCREASES JOB PERFORMANCE AND SATISFACTION.

Theater of Operation

What distinguished the Olympic activity across the nine Utah counties was whether an event was an official venue or possibly a related event of a cultural significance that would also draw a mass gathering of participants and/or spectators. When determining the status of a venue, SLOC maintained an official venue list. This consisted of the ten competition venues and approximately four other venues that were critical to the functioning of the Games. When determining the resources needed for the Olympic security plan, the funding required was matched to the official Olympic venues. Consequently, there were no surplus resources for discretionary usage. With valid concerns raised by those local authorities who’s “Olympic events” could be viewed as possible terrorist targets, last minute efforts were made to find resources that would provide an enhancement to their respective security plans.

LESSON LEARNED: REVIEW ALL EVENTS EITHER IN PROXIMITY TO THE OFFICIAL VENUES OR IN THE REGION AND DETERMINE AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE IF EXISTING SECURITY RESOURCES CAN ADEQUATELY SECURE THE EVENT. PUBLIC OFFICIALS MUST WEIGH THE POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF A LACK OF ADEQUATE SECURITY WHEN ENCOURAGING THE HOSTING OF AN OLYMPIC RELATED EVENT.

Military Support

The use of the Military seems at face value like an obvious solution when there is a large requirement for personnel or equipment. Requests made to the Defense Department would presumably be met with an enthusiastic response to assist in the Olympic Mission. This, however, was not the case. Reviews of U.S. Military personnel and equipment in previous U.S. hosted Olympics revealed support that in retrospect could not be justified. The Salt Lake Winter Olympics was armed with a supporting team of Military professionals primarily from both the U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) and the Utah National Guard (UNG). Legislation provided tight controls over what could be provided. In some cases, specialized support was provided in areas like air space security, but generally speaking, the greatest areas of support provided for operational security were in the areas of equipment assistance and explosives detection support. Both of which became critical to the enhancement efforts set in motion after the attacks of September 11th. While the Title 10 forces (JFCOM) had strict rules prohibiting their involvement in law enforcement functions, the Title 32 Forces (UNG) had more flexibility in the area of law enforcement support. The flow of military communication and support increased significantly when a Joint Task Force – Olympics was ultimately established.

LESSON LEARNED: THE MILITARY CAN PROVIDE VALUABLE SUPPORT, BUT HAS RESTRICTIONS ON THE TYPES OF DUTIES THEY CAN PERFORM. HAVING A COMMAND LEVEL OFFICER WITH DECISION- MAKING AUTHORITY ON SITE IS IMPERATIVE IF THERE IS ANY EXPECTATION THAT MILITARY SUPPORT WILL BE PROVIDED. MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PLANNERS SHOULD JOINTLY REVIEW REQUESTS BEFORE ASSISTANCE IS AUTHORIZED.

In closing, I hope my comments and the six noted lessons learned provided value to the hearing. I applaud the Committee’s efforts to bring to light past security practices that might be useful for future Olympic games.

I would be happy to answer any questions.

Thank you