

U.S.-Canada Power System Outage Task Force

**Interim Report:
Causes of the
August 14th Blackout
in the
United States and Canada**



Canada

November 2003

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Acknowledgments

The U.S.-Canada Power System Outage Task Force would like to acknowledge all the researchers, analysts, modelers, investigators, planners, designers, and others for their time and effort spent on completing this Interim Report. The result is an international coordinated report providing factual reasons as to why the power outage occurred. This Interim Report was prepared for the U.S. Secretary of Energy and the Minister of Natural Resources Canada (NRCAN) under the direction of Jimmy Glotfelty (USDOE) and Dr. Nawal Kamel and the three working groups: electric system, nuclear, and security.

Members of the three working groups and investigative teams spent an incalculable number of hours researching in various locations to better

understand the intricacies of the August 14, 2003, power outage. It was a huge endeavor to achieve, and they did an excellent job providing the facts though a variety of data requests; analysis of operations, generator and transmission modeling; sequence of events, and root cause analysis. Along with countless interviews and a variety of side investigations, the planning and preparation, coordinated internationally, all proved to be a confidently coordinated effort.

Thank you for spending countless hours on in-depth research and participating in a report that will help the North American public and the world better understand why and what caused the August 14, 2003, blackout. Your efforts are greatly appreciated! Thank you.

Contents

	Page
1. Introduction	1
2. Overview of the North American Electric Power System and Its Reliability Organizations	3
The North American Power Grid Is One Large, Interconnected Machine	3
Planning and Reliable Operation of the Power Grid Are Technically Demanding	4
Reliability Organizations Oversee Grid Reliability in North America	7
Key Parties in the Pre-Cascade Phase of the August 14 Blackout	10
3. Status of the Northeastern Power Grid Before the Blackout Sequence Began	15
Summary	15
Electric Demands on August 14	15
Power Flow Patterns	16
System Frequency	16
Generation Facilities Unavailable on August 14	17
Voltages	18
Unanticipated Outages of Transmission and Generation on August 14	19
Model-Based Analysis of the State of the Regional Power System at 15:05 EDT, Before the Loss of FE's Harding-Chamberlin 345-kV Line	20
Conclusion	20
4. How and Why the Blackout Began	21
Summary	21
Chapter Organization	21
Phase 1: A Normal Afternoon Degrades: 12:15 EDT to 14:14 EDT	22
Phase 2: FE's Computer Failures: 14:14 EDT to 15:59 EDT	28
Phase 3: Three FE 345-kV Transmission Line Failures and Many Phone Calls: 15:05 EDT to 15:57 EDT	33
Phase 4: 138-kV Transmission System Collapse in Northern Ohio: 15:39 to 16:08 EDT	43
5. The Cascade Stage of the Blackout	49
Phase 5: 345-kV Transmission System Cascade in Northern Ohio and South-Central Michigan	51
Phase 6: The Full Cascade	54
Phase 7: Several Electrical Islands Formed in Northeast U.S. and Canada: 16:10:46 EDT to 16:12 EDT	58
Why the Blackout Stopped Where It Did	61
Voltage Collapse	63
Why the Generators Tripped Off	63
6. The August 14 Blackout Compared With Previous Major North American Outages	67
Incidence and Characteristics of Power System Outages	67
Outage Descriptions and Major Causal Factors	68
Common or Similar Factors Among Major Outages	71
Comparisons With the August 14 Blackout	74
7. Performance of Nuclear Power Plants Affected by the Blackout	75
Summary	75
Findings of the U.S. Nuclear Working Group	76
Findings of the Canadian Nuclear Working Group	84
8. Physical and Cyber Security Aspects of the Blackout	93
Summary	93
Security Working Group: Mandate and Scope	93
Cyber Security in the Electricity Sector	94
Information Collection and Analysis	94
Cyber Timeline	98
Findings to Date	99

Appendixes

Page

A. Description of Outage Investigation and Plan for Development of Recommendations. 101
 B. List of Electricity Acronyms. 107
 C. Electricity Glossary 109
 D. Transmittal Letters from the Three Working Groups. 117

Tables

3.1. Generators Not Available on August 14. 17
 6.1. Changing Conditions That Affect System Reliability 68
 7.1. U.S. Nuclear Plant Trip Times 80
 7.2. Summary of Shutdown Events for Canadian Nuclear Power Plants 92

Figures

2.1. Basic Structure of the Electric System 3
 2.2. NERC Interconnections 4
 2.3. PJM Load Curve, August 18-24, 2003. 5
 2.4. Normal and Abnormal Frequency Ranges 5
 2.5. NERC Regions 8
 2.6. NERC Regions and Control Areas 9
 2.7. NERC Reliability Coordinators 10
 2.8. Reliability Coordinators and Control Areas in Ohio and Surrounding States. 10
 3.1. August 2003 Temperatures in the U.S. Northeast and Eastern Canada. 16
 3.2. Generation, Demand, and Interregional Power Flows on August 14 at 15:05 EDT 16
 3.3. Northeast Central Area Scheduled Imports and Exports: Summer 2003
 Compared to August 14, 2003 17
 3.4. Frequency on August 14, 2003, up to 15:31 EDT 17
 3.5. MW and MVar Output from Eastlake Unit 5 on August 14 20
 4.1. Timeline: Start of the Blackout in Ohio 22
 4.2. Timeline Phase 1 24
 4.3. Eastlake Unit 5 27
 4.4. Timeline Phase 2 29
 4.5. FirstEnergy 345-kV Line Flows 33
 4.6. Voltages on FirstEnergy’s 345-kV Lines: Impacts of Line Trips 34
 4.7. Timeline Phase 3 34
 4.8. Harding-Chamberlin 345-kV Line 36
 4.9. Hanna-Juniper 345-kV Line 37
 4.10. Cause of the Hanna-Juniper Line Loss 37
 4.11. Star-South Canton 345-kV Line 39
 4.12. Cumulative Effects of Sequential Outages on Remaining 345-kV Lines 40
 4.13. Timeline Phase 4 43
 4.14. Voltages on FirstEnergy’s 138-kV Lines: Impacts of Line Trips 43
 4.15. Simulated Effect of Prior Outages on 138-kV Line Loadings 45
 5.1. Area Affected by the Blackout 51
 5.2. Sammis-Star 345-kV Line Trip, 16:05:57 EDT. 51
 5.3. Sammis-Star 345-kV Line Trips. 52
 5.4. Ohio 345-kV Lines Trip, 16:08:59 to 16:09:07 EDT 53
 5.5. New York-Ontario Line Flows at Niagara 53
 5.6. Michigan and Ohio Power Plants Trip 54
 5.7. Transmission and Generation Trips in Michigan, 16:10:36 to 16:10:37 EDT 54
 5.8. Michigan Lines Trip and Ohio Separates from Pennsylvania, 16:10:36 to 16:10:38.6 EDT 55
 5.9. Active and Reactive Power and Voltage from Ontario into Detroit 55

Figures (Continued)

Page

5.10. Western Pennsylvania Separates from New York, 16:10:39 EDT to 16:10:44 EDT 56

5.11. More Transmission Line and Power Plant Losses 56

5.12. Northeast Disconnects from Eastern Interconnection. 57

5.13. New York and New England Separate, Multiple Islands Form 58

5.14. Electric Islands Reflected in Frequency Plot 60

5.15. Area Affected by the Blackout 60

5.16. Cascade Sequence 62

5.17. Events at One Large Generator During the Cascade. 64

5.18. Power Plants Tripped During the Cascade. 65

6.1. North American Power System Outages, 1984-1997. 67

